Geopolitics In One Lesson

I just read an absolutely fascinating article in Investor’s Insight, featuring a report by Stratfor on the geopolitics of China.  If you’re a politics geek like me you should read the whole thing, because it really gives a lot of insight into some of the points I’ve made here before. 

In the west we find it hard to understand why Russians would idolize Stalin or the Chinese would idolize Mao, considering their histories, but what each provided their respective nations was stability and power.  The communist ideology has the concept of equality as its alleged backbone.  What they did was make everyone equally poor, but also solidified their nations.  When the USSR fell the country splintered into a number of different countries, because the only thing holding them together was the central Soviet government.  China is exactly the same way, and if democracy were to come to the country it would suffer the same fate.  This is why there is such support among the people for the idea of a strong central government, they view it as essential to providing for China’s future peace and prosperity.

The coastal threat to China is economic, and most would not call it a threat. As we saw, the British intrusion into China culminated in the destabilization of the country, the virtual collapse of the central government and civil war. It was all caused by prosperity. Mao had solved the problem by sealing the coast of China off to any real development and liquidating the class that had collaborated with foreign business. For Mao, xenophobia was integral to natural policy. He saw foreign presence as undermining the stability of China. He preferred impoverished unity to chaos. He also understood that, given China’s population and geography, it could defend itself against potential attackers without an advanced military-industrial complex.

His successor, Deng Xiaoping, was heir to a powerful state in control of China and the buffer regions. He also felt under tremendous pressure politically to improve living standards, and he undoubtedly understood that technological gaps would eventually threaten Chinese national security. He took a historic gamble. He knew that China’s economy could not develop on its own. China’s internal demand for goods was too weak because the Chinese were too poor.

Deng gambled that he could open China to foreign investment and reorient the Chinese economy away from agriculture and heavy industry and toward export-oriented industries. By doing so he would increase living standards, import technology and train China’s workforce. He was betting that the effort this time would not destabilize China, create massive tensions between the prosperous coastal provinces and the interior, foster regionalism or put the coastal regions under foreign control. Deng believed he could avoid all that by maintaining a strong central government, based on a loyal army and communist party apparatus. His successors have struggled to maintain that loyalty to the state and not to foreign investors, who can make individuals wealthy. That is the bet that is currently being played out.

It also explains how trade is an important tool for the west to use to foment change in other nations.

The problem of China, rooted in geopolitics, is economic and it presents itself in two ways. The first is simple. China has an export-oriented economy. It is in a position of dependency. No matter how large its currency reserves or how advanced its technology or how cheap its labor force, China depends on the willingness and ability of other countries to import its goods—as well as the ability to physically ship them. Any disruption of this flow has a direct effect on the Chinese economy.

The primary reason other countries buy Chinese goods is price. They are cheaper because of wage differentials. Should China lose that advantage to other nations or for other reasons, its ability to export would decline. Today, for example, as energy prices rise, the cost of production rises and the relative importance of the wage differential decreases. At a certain point, as China’s trading partners see it, the value of Chinese imports relative to the political cost of closing down their factories will shift.

And all of this is outside of China’s control. China cannot control the world price of oil. It can cut into its cash reserves to subsidize those prices for manufacturers but that would essentially be transferring money back to consuming nations. It can control rising wages by imposing price controls, but that would cause internal instability. The center of gravity of China is that it has become the industrial workshop of the world and, as such, it is totally dependent on the world to keep buying its goods rather than someone else’s goods.

There are other issues for China, ranging from a dysfunctional financial system to farm land being taken out of production for factories. These are all significant and add to the story. But in geopolitics we look for the center of gravity, and for China the center of gravity is that the more effective it becomes at exporting, the more of a hostage it becomes to its customers. Some observers have warned that China might take its money out of American banks. Unlikely, but assume it did. What would China do without the United States as a customer?

China has placed itself in a position where it has to keep its customers happy. It struggles against this reality daily, but the fact is that the rest of the world is far less dependent on China’s exports than China is dependent on the rest of the world.

Fascinating stuff, and definitely a good insight into how to handle future dealings with Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and other potential threats.

Very interesting Lee, do you really think china internal differences are taht great, that without a strong central gov like they have now it would fracture?

Mao...provided...stability and power

Far from it!  Power, maybe, but stability?  Hell no.

When the USSR fell the country splintered into a number of different countries, because the only thing holding them together was the central Soviet government.  China is exactly the same way, ...

Absolutely not!  “China” has been multiethnic and encompassed much of the same territory as it does today.  The Chinese people have been used to centralized government since well before the Communist era.  Hell, the Chinese practically invented centralized bureaucracy.  What it means to be “Chinese” has a long and established history.

The USSR on the other hand, was only a political union.  There was nothing besides Soviet Communism holding the states together.  This system was really only a few decades old, and could not maintain a grasp on its hold in Europe.  As the dominoes of West Germany, Poland, etc. fell, there was nothing else to hold the union together.  What it meant to be “Soviet” had a fragile history.

If Chinese democracy fails, it won’t be because of the reason you say.

Absolutely not!  “China” has been multiethnic and encompassed much of the same territory as it does today.  The Chinese people have been used to centralized government since well before the Communist era.  Hell, the Chinese practically invented centralized bureaucracy.  What it means to be “Chinese” has a long and established history.

Not really.  What it means to be Chinese has been defined by whatever emperor was in power.  The current Chinese are ethnic Han, about 90% of the population, but there are something like 50 or 60 different ethnicities in the area under China’s control.  However, these people are viewed as “lesser” Chinese, second class citizens.  You don’t see non-Han Chinese in positions of power.  These different ethnicities are in the border regions, areas like Mongolia and the border with Korea.

There are so many different languages and dialect here that often times people from one city can’t understand someone from another.  Even though Mandarin is the official language, people from Beijing often go to Shanghai and remark that they can’t really understand the people there.  There are enormous cultural differences in China, the only thing these disparate people have in power is the centralized bureaucracy.

The USSR on the other hand, was only a political union.  There was nothing besides Soviet Communism holding the states together.  This system was really only a few decades old, and could not maintain a grasp on its hold in Europe.  As the dominoes of West Germany, Poland, etc. fell, there was nothing else to hold the union together.  What it meant to be “Soviet” had a fragile history.

The same goes for China.  If the PRC were to disintegrate as the USSR did you would see the same splintering.  If China transitions to something different then you might see some kind of unity amongst the different people.  But when you have the income disparity that China has—wealth in the cities of the east, poverty in the countryside of the west—it’s going to be tempting for certain areas to assert themselves out of their own self interest.

That being said, I think if a democracy movement here fails it will be because, by and large, most people aren’t interested in it.  They’re fine with the system they way it is, they’d just rather reform it from the inside.  There’s no reason the Chinese couldn’t devise some kind of system which keeps the central authoritarian bureaucracy while reforming the court system and adding legal protections for individuals.  It will never be to the level of the US, though, but I doubt most Chinese would want that.  They see countries like the US as unstable (the 2000 election, for example) and prone to barbarism in much the same way that the Middle East does.

When people in the West protest, for example, the Chinese look at it as a sign of weakness on the part of the foreign governments.  “Can’t these foreign barbarians control their people?  Look, they’re acting like uncivilized savages!”

I don’t think we’ll ever see any sort of western-style democracy in this country, because the centralized authoritarian tendency is part of the social and cultural fabric.

Here’s a Wikipedia page showing the various ethnic groups in China.  Click on the graphic to see how these groups are disbursed.  As you can see there are a number of distinct regions.  Remember, a lot of these people don’t even speak the same language.

The current Chinese are ethnic Han, about 90% of the population, but there are something like 50 or 60 different ethnicities in the area under China’s control.  However, these people are viewed as “lesser” Chinese, second class citizens.  You don’t see non-Han Chinese in positions of power.  These different ethnicities are in the border regions, areas like Mongolia and the border with Korea.

There are so many different languages and dialect here that often times people from one city can’t understand someone from another.  Even though Mandarin is the official language, people from Beijing often go to Shanghai and remark that they can’t really understand the people there. There are enormous cultural differences in China, the only thing these disparate people have in power is the centralized bureaucracy.

While this is generally true, the conclusions you draw are incorrect.  You seem to forget that the “centralized bureaucracy” has been around for many centuries.  While there are certainly many ethnicities, they all share a strong common heritage of being part of China.  There have only been minor periods of fragmentation, and all have occurred prior to the development of the nation-state as we know it.  This is VERY different from the Soviet experience.

What it means to be Chinese has been defined by whatever emperor was in power. 

I strongly disagree.  While of course the Emperor had more influence than any single individual, what it means to be “Chinese” extends well beyond a particular ruler.  China has an extraordinary history of new Emperors essentially keeping the entire state intact while replacing the previous Emperor.  During these dynastic changes (e.g. when the Mongols took over), very little changed for the average Chinese, and certainly the definition of what it meant to be Chinese didn’t change more than that.

The same goes for China.  If the PRC were to disintegrate as the USSR did you would see the same splintering.  If China transitions to something different then you might see some kind of unity amongst the different people.  But when you have the income disparity that China has—wealth in the cities of the east, poverty in the countryside of the west—it’s going to be tempting for certain areas to assert themselves out of their own self interest.

Now that the zoomzoom political history lesson is over, we enter the realm of informed speculation.  I certainly grant the possibility of what you say occuring.  You are much more in touch with the Chinese experience of today than I (although I think your view is sheltered being in Beijing). 

However, the historical context you use to make your judgments about what is likely to happen if the PRC disintegrates was faulty, making me question the result.  In other words, “China” has been around a LOT longer than the PRC.

That being said, I think if a democracy movement here fails it will be because, by and large, most people aren’t interested in it.  They’re fine with the system they way it is, they’d just rather reform it from the inside.

This is a very Chinese attitude and I couldn’t agree more.

When people in the West protest, for example, the Chinese look at it as a sign of weakness on the part of the foreign governments.  “Can’t these foreign barbarians control their people?  Look, they’re acting like uncivilized savages!”

Very true, and this reinforces my point about what it means to be Chinese.  China is steeped in millenia-old traditions that are still core to the Chinese identity today.  The attitude you describe is the result of this tradition, which is very different from the West.  It’s so strong though, and even more so in this era of communication, that I do not at all see the fragmentation of China if the PRC disintegrates.  While there have been some periods of fragmentation, they have all been before the era of the nation-state.  I simply do not see disintegration happening.

And in case you didn’t know already, I focused intently on Sino-Soviet politics the last 2 years of college.  I find the relationship between the two utterly fascinating, in part because there has been relatively little Western scholarship regarding these two VERY different Communist powers.  I really enjoy digging into these issues, which is part of why I really enjoy reading you.

corr: *intensely* in the last paragraph

While this is generally true, the conclusions you draw are incorrect.  You seem to forget that the “centralized bureaucracy” has been around for many centuries.  While there are certainly many ethnicities, they all share a strong common heritage of being part of China.  There have only been minor periods of fragmentation, and all have occurred prior to the development of the nation-state as we know it.  This is VERY different from the Soviet experience.

Oh, absolutely.  That being said, the Chinese identity has always been largely a function of the central bureaucracy, whether it was fealty to the emperor or the ROC or the PRC.  One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese people is the way that they make no real distinction between ethnicity, culture, and government. 

In the west we view criticizing the government as the pinnacle of a functioning society.  The right to free speech, especially political speech, is ingrained in the western tradition and has been for a few hundred years.  The Chinese don’t understand this, which is why they view protests in the west against Chinese policies as insults to the Chinese people and to China itself.  China, being isolated from the rest of the world for most of its history, has only now begun to come to terms with the idea of foreigners being critical of their internal matters.  When it comes to a contentious issue like Tibet they think, “Who the fuck are these foreign barbarians to tell us how to handle our own affairs?” The barbarians aspect is important, too, because they don’t view you as worthy of criticizing them.

I think that the challenge going forward for the PRC is going to me to mitigate internal criticism while maintaining the idea that being Chinese is a function of ethnicity, culture, and government.  (Call it the Holy Trinity of China.) The government needs to keep the people happy, because happy people don’t revolt.  But look at what happened with the recent earthquake.  A hundred thousand dead, schools collapsing, and so on.  Now that the initial shock has begun to wear off people are beginning to wonder why the government failed so miserably.  The see earthquakes in the west, major ones, taking less than 100 lives, and they compare that to the Chinese experience, with 100,000 dead.

Buildings in important areas don’t collapse.  It’s only in areas filled with peasants.  The government is going to have to begin to address this, because if the disparity between the cities and the rest of the country continues to expand (as is expected) this will foment disillusionment with the government.  A large group of protesters in the earthquake area gathered to protest against the government and they were quickly and forcibly disbursed by government troops.  This volatility is a recent phenomenon brought about by China’s rapid economic growth.

China has a rhetorical commitment to equality.  It’s part of the communist credo.  I just found out recently that Chinese women do not traditionally adopt the family names of their husbands when they marry.  This was an edict from Mao under the rubric of equality.  Prior to the PRC the tradition was to change names, but Mao declared women equal to men in that regard and forbade it.  So the concept of egalitarianism (even if it just meant that everyone was equally poor and equally starving and equally oppressed) is still there.  The people in the hinterlands want to believe that they are still being treated equally by the central bureaucracy, but unless the government actually delivers on that promise the people will begin to see themselves as detached.

Think of American history.  Prior to the Civil War Americans viewed themselves as being from a particular state—you were a Virginian or a Georgian, that sort of thing.  It was only after the defeat of the South and the subsequent by oppression by the North that this individual spirit gave way to a national identity.  The authoritarianism of China is similar in that, whether it was the emperor or the PRC, there was always a central ideal (emperor worship or communist equality) that bound the people together.  Now that the government is less communist and experiencing rapid change, the challenge is going to be for them to maintain that sense of central identity, because they may see the reverse of the American experience—people will still view themselves as Chinese but may view themselves as less tied to Beijing.  “The people in the cities are rich while we still live in handmade houses!  They don’t care about us!”

Remember, Europe used to be all about kings and emperors and religion.  It was only after a period of enlightenment that change began to occur.  The pinnacle of that enlightenment was the American Revolution and the subsequent ratification of the Constitution.  China has no religion to bind the people together, only a sense of culture and government.  If the government fails, it falls back to the culture, and I don’t know if that is a strong enough glue to keep so many disparate people together.  Before the Civil War, when people regarded themselves as being from a particular state, that was an internal differentiation.  If an American went overseas he was “an American.” So people can simultaneously have a group identity and an individual identity.  There’s no reason that this sort of dynamic couldn’t evolve in China.  They would view themselves as Chinese, but also recognize that there are significant internal differences among the billion and a half people in the country.

That’s the challenge going forward, keeping the people happy and maintaining the Holy Trinity.  If those begin to fail, there’s no telling what may happen.

And in case you didn’t know already, I focused intently on Sino-Soviet politics the last 2 years of college.  I find the relationship between the two utterly fascinating, in part because there has been relatively little Western scholarship regarding these two VERY different Communist powers.  I really enjoy digging into these issues, which is part of why I really enjoy reading you.

Me too.  I’m fascinated by communism.  I’m a child of the Cold War.  Communism, especially in the post-Soviet era, is a never ending source of wonder for me.  You obviously have more formal study in this area than I do, but I’ve got the “eyes on the ground.” Yes, you’re right, I’m definitely limited to Beijing and Shanghai in my experiences here.  You do meet a lot of people from the outlying areas, though, because they all come here to work.  Most of the Chinese who work for me are from somewhere else—Xi’an, Sichuan, and so on.  So while I haven’t traveled to those places (yet) I do get to meet people from all over.